

Notes on Pres Speech

Invitation from Brown (Pat joins);

Pres refusal to share responsibility (see above note)

Congress cancels hearings (leaving me...); where to turn?

Individual Congressmen; courts; Institutes; academic;

Meanwhile, little prospect of PP being effective...I plan to stay at RAND

Sexstateemateasxssolid**ndtllxnewxKet

EATON'S
(CORRASABLE)
BOND
USA
BERKSHIRE
COTTON FIBER CONTENT

RAND letter:

- ✓ Options exercise; NSSM-1: last effort to inform a President.
- ✓ by spring: disillusion with MW: question was, what then?
- ✓ Halperin: Pres had picked ISA 1968 strategy: reduced-cost, indefinite stay. This was consistent with: a) rejection of UW (by HAK, Pres), plus (b) JCS answers to NSSM-1: residual force needed. Chappaquiddick
- ✓ Finish PP: to change strategy, share responsibility with Pres war illegitimate (students right! must be supported)

✓ WRL: if necessary, go to jail.

— Bolte letter; but little response. ELK statement: no signers. ~~Boote~~

✓ I join UW faction: what to do? Clearance problem; need for letter. Goodell proposal; but still need for expert testimony.

— Green Berets; PP.

✓ X Invitation to testify: but postponed by announcement of Pres speech.

✓ X Pres: refusal to share responsibility. Chappaquiddick/ ?

— X Congress: fear of taking whole responsibility.

RAND: fear of retaliation for public statement.

(stability of stalemate: pressures of fear, of loss of security of denunciation, shame, lack of patriotism or will to win (Patton; Lombardi))

(hence: in presence of failure, fear of responsibility, fear of knowing--that might compel "action against the system, disobedience, action against the rules)

I turn ~~tax~~ away fro

What's wrong with that?

Vs. intraps: - Public demand came
- from narrowest expectations, kind...
- Also

Lo-Jay

(the rebellion Pres is still far out...)

27 March 72

Vs. cred. gap

What has made VN policy so
intractable, so impervious to resistance,
is that resistance must counteract the
assurances of the President, which
dominate the media: it is necessary to
contradict the President, which no pol
wants to do, partly because (he thinks it
wrong, and he is afraid, and he wants things
from the Pres — the king's corruption of
parliament; and) no one will believe him:
(Pres has wife) especially when Pres is saying what
people want to believe & find "most plausible"

(1) Phase A: it thin fight — we
won't go in (1946-65) ^(most of the time) our friends are winning

(2) Phase B — We're winning
1965-68

(3) Phase C:

We're getting out; the war is ending.

(We were always: in; was not winning;

staying in.) The war was never ending.

What Can Candidates do for US? (for US; for VN war?)

Draw inspiration from: Ho, Mao (not Gao)

NLF

Past US resistance

Draft resisters

Beriger, etc. ! !

See wikipedia: System (Understand) (Change) ^{Org.}

Complicity (Resist) (Expose)

LOOK SERIOUS:

Org:

Filibuster

Commitment to vote against
abstract

educate on --- origins, illegality; viability

bills: connect ---

(don't accept "apathy":
as of Admin)

support R

Hearings

Caucus

Pres next Pres;
Pres this Pres;

Approach

Expose lies; punish

(Kleinman!)

Investigate (e.g. in VN)

anti-GVN; coalition, legitimacy of NLF.

TDA; anti-execution

LESSONS OF PPP: Expi/Log; Const; ^{Estab} LSD; C-R; anti-McG, CW

See Bell mfg, PP-18 23
to RANO study is

Rosamund	Call Tuesday
Frank	556-4888

Sea of Pigs — half failures, half successes.

Entloun

Paraphrase to "Cathart"

Baltic (morals)
McPherson / Wankel

"Cost" vs RAND letter: morals

~~Bob~~ Moratomin

Nixon:

Background:

RAND M4M on NLF

Killer to HAK

Zaslavoff

Schles & Ted White

Dom Rep...

Quay - If Pres ~~had~~ been told, "Impossible"

- what would he have said or done

difficult? Was he really knowing losses?

Or...

Exp. with mine would still have
behaved.

~~p. 1 - Describe papers.~~

~~Handle CW footnotes: Q.M.?~~

30. Add 1948 quote

Q.M.

Pres' did not: (a) believe estimates

(b) predict their own, or successors' future behavior

(in part, because they did not study their own, or learn their predecessors').

Add: Bengala, Balti, RAND.

Invisible War

~~What was~~

The first of these acts was in itself so derisive, so "aberrant" (as an unnamed former Rand colleague described it recently to a journalist) that ~~the secret~~ in the eyes of my long-time associates that the second act, if they had known about it, would have seemed scarcely more shocking.

The exchange with the local official came when I showed him a letter I had proposed to send to the ~~Acting~~ Charles Ballé, acting head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ~~On November 2, December, 1967,~~ the Endowment had called together ^{at Bermuda} a group of prestigious former ^{Government} officials and consultants — I was included as someone just back from Vietnam — to draft a private, ~~considerate~~ ^{appeal} appeal for deescalation to be given to the Secretary of State (with whom several of them had worked in the past) and the President. Few present would have been willing to "put pressure on the President," or to hint their own future access, by making their difference of opinion public; their backgrounds as Cold Warriors and Insiders were equivalent, though senior, to mine. But the President was not grateful, and someone in the White House leaked the statement to the New York Times.* ~~But the House was unintended,~~ The result of "surfacing" inadvertently

* ~~The~~ New York Times, _____. The list of ~~participants~~ participants, and a comment on the incident, is also given in Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention, pp. _____. My own concern in the joint drafting process was to emphasize the warning: "But if we were to pursue present objectives by widening the war, as by ground probes into Laos and Cambodia, our commitments would escalate along with our risks, and the next step could be an invasion of North Vietnam. Such developments would entail unacceptable risks and threaten world peace."

(Research by John Henry for his senior honors thesis at Harvard, June, 1971, has ~~shown~~ gone beyond the Pentagon Papers to show that this expansion was definitely desired by Westmoreland at the time of this statement

~~and continued to be~~ ^{was still} ~~proposed~~ ^{used} by him to the JCS even after the Tet Offensive, as the basis for his request for additional troops.)

as a ~~critic~~ ^{was} of the war ~~in late 1967~~ ^{in late 1967}, ~~and no doubt others~~ ^{and no doubt others} had less fatal to his status ^{as} ~~as~~ ^{than it would have been at other times;} ~~affected~~; I was, indeed, promptly cut off from access to cable traffic in one office in the Pentagon where I was accustomed to work (~~the~~ by a boss, I later learned, who was protecting his ~~own~~ identity as a secret dove), but ^{offered} ~~granted~~ access in another one.

The objective was to persuade a Democratic President that fellow Democrats would support him if he "moderated" the war. Now something much tougher ^(second) ~~was~~ needed:

I also argued successfully for the inclusion of the thought, ~~intentionally-drafted~~ ^{intentionally-drafted} ~~which required~~ ^{which required} ~~intentional drafting~~ ^{as now} ~~which then required~~ ^{intentional drafting}: INSERT

to ~~now~~ tell a Republican President that Democrats would not only share responsibility but, in effect, take the rap for a lost war, if he would pick up the option he had excluded early in the year: total unilateral withdrawal. With mutual withdrawal having been rejected by Hanoi in the spring of 1969, I now agreed with my fine Keratic colleagues

at least that unilateral withdrawal was the only path out of quicksand; and that it was open, probably, only to a new President and not for much longer, as the ~~first~~ end of his first year approached. If ~~ever~~ ~~Indochina~~ and Annam were not to be sentenced to from 3 to 7 ~~years' or more or less~~ years of ^{"Nixon's"} ~~Tabar~~, it seemed to me, the President must be encouraged to shift the burden of failure to the opposing party — which had earned it fairly — in ^{the weeks or} ~~the~~ months before he ~~finally~~ ^{instead} committed himself publicly to ~~his~~ ^{the} new, private strategy ~~and before~~ ^{the} the passage of time that I had heard described.

~~On October 23, 1969,~~

My letter to Balte, dated September 23, 1969, ~~was~~ was phrased formally, for circulation in the upper reaches of the Establishment:

INSERT A

Mike Wallace, March 16, 1972

Warner + others, asked about McN "speaking out":

- McN would have to contradict CBS; cite private conversations ...
- Process of reanimation would lead to a "political bloodbath" ...
- It would hurt the Democrats, in an election year...

(1972: same argument as in 1969, except that was not an election year ...)

- 3MT, 3 million refugees later, 2 million later...

AND THE BOMBING IS STILL GOING ON

Why fiddle while Nixon bombs.

Peter Stone

Prince

Allen

Doc Simon

~~Rocky~~

Still "too much": role of Congress
press
courts
openness/dissent

Issue:

the "steroid";
values w/out
empire
war/hilly
racism
self-determin.
US culture

Do we have the right system of gov, and the right population, to conduct colonial wars in the post-WWII environment (i.e. against determined R with a friendly P and outside assistance, perhaps even sanctuaries)? Or does IV have to change our gov — 1st Amendment — to do it?

(We don't have quite the right State + Defense Dept, or CIA — though a "better" job could probably have been done by them except for political constraints of S-R and covertness/deception.

Even British were undone by the Boer War — though the "war," — and lost Amer. Rev.

Didn't fight in India, Burma; did in Malaya, Cyprus, Palestine, Kenya

[Suppose we had many West in this country — like Algerians in France — and bombs were being thrown indiscriminately as we do in Indochina ...]

Can other theories explain these characteristics as well?

S-r (+ reliance on ARVN/GVN) (lack of leverage)
lies.... (to get support for Rule I from Cong, public)

CW

How much does difference come down to:

(1) ~~the~~ Preventing protectionist policies abroad
"liberal"
(→ internationalist) (while maintaining rhetoric of fighting protectionism at home); maintaining US exports.

vs. (2) Protectionist at home
"Conservative"
(→ "isolationist") (protecting US home market, US domestic sale; preventing imports)

(There is a basis of alliance here; the two are not incompatible. Also, defense spending abroad is a way of maintaining US exports ~~with~~ while preventing imports of commercial goods).

Lippman

1. Very little talk of econ matters, avoiding depression.
[even tho feeling him?]
except from Clayton. (Not Ackerson?)

2. Thg did wrong